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ABSTRACT
The several orders of compossibility must be sorted out «before» the divine decision to
create this or that universe, since God’s decision must be grounded in a sufficient reason,
which can only arise from the divine essence itself and the intrinsic qualities of the orders
among which He has to make the choice; the greatest perfection of an order of things is
mirrored and expressed in every integral component of that order. Consequently, the
concept of every real thing does from all eternity contain the unavoidability of its existence
before the divine decision. Thus every complete concept of a real thing contains the
property of being such that the thing will exist if a created universe exists. Then a thing’s
existence cannot be external to its concept. There is bound to be more in the concept of
something that exists than in that of «something» that does not — since existence is
explained through the quidditative property of being an essence that constitutes an integral
part of the most perfect series of things. It is such an essential, quidditative perfection
which explains the divine decision, and hence existence. Therefore existence can be deduced
from that essential perfection. The essence-as-such, the mere possible, contains something
from which existence follows. What Leibniz never manages to explain is what distinguishes
existence from that quidditative perfection it unavoidably stems from.
§1.— ROOTS AND SCOPE OF LEIBNIZIAN NECESSITARIANISM
Leibniz’s main ontological claim is that essences are possible-entities striving to exist,
on each of which existence devolves in accordance with its own essential perfection; however,
since there are essences whose existentialization is incompatible with others’ — those which are
incompossible with them — , one single global order of compossible-entities can alone be
realized. Which one? The best of all.
That global order, the real world, will encompass only all those essences one of whose
quidditative properties is that of belonging to a world that is the best possible one. (For, Leibniz
considers all properties essential, and thinks that every individual reflects the whole universe
it belongs to, since, among the properties of an individual, one of them is that of belonging to
an universe such that ..., where the leaders are to be replaced by any sentence true of the
universe in question.) God can create only the best possible world: either He creates nothing,
or else He creates the best. Yet, in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason, some suitable
reason or other must prompt the divine decision of creating or failing to create; and, if that
reason is a divine intention of taking such a decision, that divine intention will also have to
have its own sufficient reason. And so on and so forth.
In the last resort the root of all that there is or will be is God’s essence. God himself
is an entity, a subject, the supreme monad. As happens with any other entity or substance, each
predicate which can be truthfully assigned to Him is included in His essence or complete
notion. God can constitute no exception to the general rule that praedicatum inest subiecto.
Each individual’s properties are, all of them, essential to him; an individual’s actions stem, all
of them, from the agent’s essence. Thus God’s decision to create is essential to Him and stems
from His essence. That’s why God, in virtue of His essence, could not help taking the decision
to create some world; «once» He had taken such a decision, He could not help taking that of
creating the best possible world, i.e. this world; thus, in the end, God could not help creating
this world; no other world could be created instead of the best one, and a complete absence of
any created world at all was not a real possibility either, since it would run afoul of the divine
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decision to do what is best (a general decision such that, should God fail to honour it, He would
not be necessarily optimal, which assuredly He is for Leibniz). No world can put itself into
existence; no possible world can reach existence except through God’s creative decision.
Accordingly no other world was possible; and since that alone is possible which belongs to a
possible world, nothing is possible except what is real. Then everything real is necessarily real.
Thus, such considerations as we were, to start with, putting forward concerning sundry
unrealized possible essences turn out, upon reflection, to constitute, for Leibniz, mere heuristic
devices, because the outcome of our arguments enforces upon us a necessitarianism not unlike
Spinoza’s, namely that there are no really possible essences except those of entities which do
in fact exist.
Consequently, all truths are necessary, i.e. truths of reason, although the human
intellect is not able to grasp every truth as a truth of reason. The only difference which remains
between truths of fact and truths of reason proper is a merely epistemologic-human one: a truth
of reason, from the human point of view, is one whose predicate is to be found by analysing
the notion of the subject through a finite number of steps; whenever, instead, an infinite analysis
is to be carried out in order for the notion of the predicate to emerge as one contained in that
of the subject, the statement, although on its own, by itself, remaining a truth of reason, is
quoad nos, only a truth of fact.
In other words, except as an initial stage, that of a heuristic or explanatory procedure,
there is for Leibniz no order of possible non-existent essences (barring the divine ideas
corresponding with things). What is possible is what exists only.
I will here refrain from going into the Leibnizian notion of «best-world». Suffice it to
say, in that connection, that there are two parameters to compare the degree of goodness of two
possible worlds: entitative riches (a world is better if it contains more entities, or a series of
entities which taken together amount to more reality, more variety); and simplicity of the ways
and means through which such a riches is achieved; although Leibniz does not say how both
factors are to be coupled, combined and weighted, he thinks, nevertheless, that the combination
does indeed take place, a determinate outcome arising. But, in the end, only a world is possible:
the real world. Other worlds are not possible, but imaginable; they are (as Leibniz emphasizes
in the famous Tarquinius fable of the Essais de Théodiccée) complete novels. (Leibniz fails to
raise the problem of how it is possible for «something» to bear to somebody the relation of
being-imagined-by without that something being anything, not even properly a possible entity.)
In order to shun the strict necessitarian conclusion to which the sum of diverse
principles of his philosophy commits him, Leibniz could try one of the two following solutions:
1. To maintain that the principle of sufficient reason is contingent. Then this particular
application instance thereof may be contingent, namely: that there is a reason why God decides
to create, or why God decides not to create; and that there is a reason why, if He decides to
create, He decides to create this world rather than any other. Then, even if that reason is
necessary, the conditional link between the reason and what it explains would be contingent,
and so the explanandum could remain contingent too. But such a «solution» is not Leibnizian;
it is appropriate to ask, as regards the principle of sufficient reason itself, what its sufficient or
determinant reason is; and — according to the Leibnizian outlook — no infinite regression is
legitimate. Hence, in the last resort, the divine nature itself, which is necessary, can alone
constitute a sufficient reason for the principle of sufficient reason. The latter will thus be non-
contingent; unless we claim that it is the link between the divine nature and the principle of
sufficient reason which is contingent; but that link will then call for a sufficient reason, which
in turn will call for another reason, and so on: to avoid the infinite regress, we must assume that
the link is necessary. Moreover, Leibniz takes it as obvious that «x is sufficient reason for y»
means that, necessarily, if x exists, y also exists; then the link of sufficient reason, or of
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grounding, if true, is necessarily true, regardless of whether the principle of sufficient reason
itself is necessary or not (although, on the other hand, the principle must be necessary if — as
we have seen — the link of sufficient reason is non-contingent and if the Leibnizian conception
of modality keeps to a pattern not unlike the one which has been nowadays implemented
through logical system S5, as has been cogently suggested by Rescher and other interpreters).
2. To maintain that, for Leibniz, an infinite regress can be admitted. Then the decision
to create this world has as its own sufficient reason the decision to decide to create it; and this,
in turn, has as its sufficient reason the decision of taking the decision to decide to create it; and
so on, infinitely. All those decisions (that of creating, that of deciding to create, that of deciding
to decide to create, etc.) would be contingent, no decision being the supreme or the first one,
no decision directly springing from the divine nature (should a decision directly stem from
God’s nature, it would be necessary, and then all the links in the chain would turn out to be
necessary, too). But it is hard to believe that such an infinite regress could be seriously
entertained — let alone wholeheartedly espoused — by Leibniz; not because he fails to accept
infinity in general, far from it (although late in his life he seems to have become more cautious
in that connection); but because, even though Leibniz is inclined to accept an infinite
progression, he is apparently reluctant to acquiesce in a regression, i.e. a series each of whose
links requires other links, previously given, and so infinitely on; moreover, because Leibniz,
with his critical-probing, rationalist turn of mind, would have asked whether all the series has
a sufficient reason; and if it has one, and the reason — whatever it may be — has another, and
so infinitely on, all this new series will be bound to have its own sufficient reason; and the
series of series of series of ... of series will be bound to have an ultimate sufficient reason.
But then, what are we to make of Leibniz’s tireless reassurances to the effect that a
distinction is to be recognized between metaphysical or geometric necessity and merely
conditional necessity, necessity ex hypothesi? The difference is epistemological and heuristic,
not ontological. Such a difference originates as follows: an assertible content is said to be
metaphysically or «geometrically» necessary if, and only if, we humans can prove its logical
necessity, through a finite number of demonstrative steps (since there are no infinitely long
demonstrations); the necessity of an assertible content is physical, or conditional if we are
unable to demonstrate its truth but it can be proved that, if certain antecedent facts are true or
real, the content under consideration is also true or real, while we judge those antecedent facts
to obtain.
The opposition between Leibniz and Spinoza boils down to the following disagreement:
Leibniz emphasizes that, due to its weakness and finiteness, the human intellect cannot
demonstrate that all the truths of fact it records are logical truths; but for an infinite intellect,
able to understand the complete notion of every thing with the infinitely many determinations
it encompasses, and to carry out infinitely long demonstrations it is possible to prove any truth
of fact from truths of reason (truths which — Leibniz mistakenly believes — can all be deduced
from the principle of identity or non-contradiction). On the other hand, Spinoza would be
sceptical about such an infinite intellect conceived in what to his mind is an excessively
anthropomorphistic way.
For Leibniz, there would be truths irreducibly factual, not only epistemologically quoad
nos, but ontologically quoad se — and, therefore, quoad Deum — if the divine decision to create
was a contingent one, if it lacked any sufficient reason or if whatever bears to that decision the
ancestral of the relation of being-sufficient-reason-for was contingent (an entity x bears to an
entity z the ancestral of a certain relation, say that of teaching-Latin, if, and only if, either x
teaches Latin to z, or x teaches Latin to somebody who teaches Latin to z, or x teaches Latin
to somebody who, in turn, teaches Latin to somebody who teaches Latin to z, or..., and so on
with any finite number of intermediate links). But, then, God would be the sole entity whose
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notion would not encompass all its properties, accidents and relations, which would bring in an
inexplicable and astounding anomaly, which, to boot, would prevent God from knowing Himself
rationally, in so much as He could no longer deduce all his own properties from his own
infinite notion.
Nevertheless, desirous as he is of finding some ground to assert that contingent truths
are such even, in a certain sense, quoad Deum, or quoad se, Leibniz, in his booklet Generales
Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum (1686), hopes to find it as follows: necessary
properties are identical, they are grounded on the principle of identity. Instead, contingent
statements cannot be reduced to identical statements, since the complete notion of a monad is
not a mere sum of predicates — those predicates being infinitely many — but a law generating
a sequence of predicates and permitting, once a step in the sequence is given, to carry the
sequence on by finding the following step. Moreover a statement such as ‘Peter denies’ can
have no concrete sense and no truth-value until the moment and other circumstances are given.
But the moment cannot be exhaustively analyzed except by pointing to all entities existent at
that moment.
Contingent statements are, so to speak, asymptotic: they can be brought indefinitely
nearer to the status of necessary truths. They would be inexhaustible. A contingent statement
should be indemonstrable (except from contingent premises), but could be brought indefinitely
closer to its demonstration.
Such is, at least, the interpretation put forward by many Leibniz scholars such as Yvon
Belaval, in his valuable books on the author of the Monadology (e.g. [B:1]). But such
interpretation turns out to be mistaken, because God can perfectly understand the law that
engenders all the series as well as all the series of predicates itself; and God does not need —
as mistakenly and gratuitously Belaval assumes —, in order to understand a truth as truth of
reason, to have «exhausted» the series it enters into, in the sense of having reached the end or
the last stage of the series, which is obviously impossible, the series being infinite and thus
lacking any end or last stage. But why must we demand such a far-fetched feat? The infinite
mind possessing an infinite capacity, it can intellectually see all the infinitely many members
or links of the series, and — since every series of the predicates of an individual encompasses
all the truths of the universe that individual belongs to, all the truths of the universe, including
all the true existences in the universe. (See [K:1], pp. 230-1, and references in pp. 254-5.) What
is more, Leibniz explicitly says in a paper edited by Couturat: ‘... Existentiales siue contingentes
[propositiones], quarum ueritas a sola Mente infinita a priori intelligitur...’ (existential or
contingent propositions are those whose truth is understood a priori only by an infinite Mind).
And even in the booklet brought forward by Belaval Leibniz says that the truth of true
existential propositions is proved ‘infinitis adhibitis’, i.e. by resorting to an infinity of deductive
steps — which is quite possible for an infinite mind, as God’s.
It may be objected against my interpretation that Leibniz very often claimed that purely
possibles are bound to be there somehow, and that, else, contingency would not exist, the world
would be necessary and God would unavoidably do what He in fact does. (See [B:1], p. 159;
in a similar opinion is subscribed to by what Leibniz says in his letter to Bernouilli of 13 march
1699.) Such pronouncements on Leibniz’s part stem: either from an occasional lack of
consequence (a sin which is probably committed by every philosopher and human being); or
from half-regrets over some consequences of his philosophy, consequences which our author
would then understandably try to blunt; or from diplomatic caution, a wariness which was more
than justified then as we can see even now, when necessitarianism continues to arouse appalling
uproar and turmoil; or (last, not least) from his deep-rooted belief that truth is widely shared
and that whenever a philosophical tenet seems hotly debatable, it probably had rather be
couched in such as way that people do not balk at it, since such people as were tempted to do
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so cannot be so unreasonable that they cling to beliefs totally in contradiction with what reason
(philosophy) teaches. Moreover, Leibniz genuinely tries to keep some sort of difference between
necessary and contingent truths. Preserving such a difference is doubtless one of his main
motivations all through his philosophical career. Yet that such a motivation or goal exists is no
proof of success.
In the end what Leibniz is able to establish within the framework of his philosophical
approach is a merely epistemological cleavage, not an ontological one: God creates necessarily
what He creates (should the world be different from the way it is, God would not be God); but
such a necessity is so intricate that we cannot demonstrate what it consists is, or why it is
necessary for God to create this world; what alone can be proved by us is that, once this
world’s existence is assumed — an assumption which we take for granted in virtue of our
experience — , it follows that God was bound to create it.
§2.— THE LEIBNIZIAN NOTION OF ESSENCE
We have seen that every truth of fact quoad nos is a truth of reason quoad se and
quoad Deum, and that every property or true predication of a subject is contained in the infinite
notion of that subject. Thus, it is contradictory for Plato not to write the Phaedo dialogue. Since
we cannot prove that it is contradictory, such truth is, to us (on a merely epistemological level),
a mere truth of fact, a contingent truth.
Not unlike other authors belonging to the philosophical tradition — such as Aquinas and
Scotus, with other nuances or qualifications — Leibniz regards pure essences or possibilia as
God’s ideas, rationes diuinae. But, thus understood the meaning of ‘essence’, it must be
distinguished from what means ‘essence’ when applied to finite entities. A finite entity is, for
Leibniz, the same as its existence and also the same as its essence or species infima. But there
is an idea or divine notion, which can also be called ‘essence’, and which corresponds to the
existing essence of that individual (and Leibniz, as a nominalist philosopher — or, more exactly
perhaps, a reist one —, assigns reality to individual substances only — although his theory of the
substantial bond [uinculum substantiale] opens a breach into such a nominalist reism).
To prevent a confusion I’ll call the divine idea the ‘essence-as-such’, so as to
distinguish it from the individual, which is the same as its essence or species infima, a species
existent as a finite being in the created universe.
The divine substance, although it is simple, is composed of simple perfections. God
by knowing himself knows those simple perfections under the form of simple absolute notions.
They are co-eternal with God’s substance, «preceding» any decision to create. They express the
divine substance and through them is God infinitely perfect. Such perfections constitute the
quality of essences-as-such; every essence-as-such has a degree of perfection. The essence-as-
such is a degree of every perfection combined with degrees of others perfections. The essences-
as-such are also co-eternal with the divine substance and they are the proper field of the
principle of non-contradiction.
Sometimes (mainly in some of his early essays) Leibniz seems to suggest that, unlike
pure essences, complete notions of individuals are not co-eternal with God, since, in addition
to the specific differences, they include a reference to time, in virtue of which this or that
individual is the one which it in fact is, and no other. Such a temporal reference involves the
temporal decree that entails the law of its concrete existence realized under the form of the set
of predicates that will make up a substance. Such is Robinet’s interpretation ([R:1], p.50).
Robinet tries to prevent a necessitarian construal of Leibniz as the one I am now proposing.
Nevertheless, such a difference only means that, within the essences-as-such, a
distinction is to be made between, on the one hand, complete essences of individuals, and, on
the other, essences of species non infimae, i.e. of kinds of greater or smaller generality. Those
of individuals are infinite, and entail an infinity of perfections — on account of which they
«Essence and existence in Leibniz’s ontology» by Lorenzo Peña 6
cannot be intellectually known by man; those of kinds are finite and entail only a finite number
of predicates or perfections, owing to which they can often be known intellectually by a human
individual. In such a context, ‘pure essence’ designates a generic essence exhaustively
intelligible through a finite number of steps. As regards the would-be co-eternality between God
and the essences-as-such (or complete notions) of individuals, Leibniz admits that, rigorously
speaking, there is a strict co-eternality between God and such notions; still, being infinitely
complex, such notions entail, in their content, a reference to time, to succession, to a temporal
order and a coordination with an infinite number of other essences-as-such; and, thus, they do
not express divine perfections as simply and immediately as incomplete or generic essences do;
generic essences do not contain any idea of time, because time appears as an order and
coordination of an infinity of things; thus, the very expression of generic essences, what they
express, is devoid of temporal structure; whereas what is expressed through the complete notion
of an individual involves time, even if the complete notion is not temporal but eternal.
While identifying the divine notions with the essences-as-such of finite entities, Leibniz
wants to surmount the controversy between the thomistic view-point (according to which God
knows possibilia as they are present in God, since they are God’s ideas) and that of Francisco
Suárez (according to which God knows possibilia as they are in themselves, with their own
being; such a being is, for Suárez, only a mere being-so, not being tout court or existence).
Essences-as-such do not have any other being but the one they have in God as God’s ideas. But
such a reduction runs into difficulties which had already been pointed out by Henry of Gaunt,
Alnwick, Poncius, Suárez, and other late Scholastics. Scotus himself had assigned to the
uncreated essence in its «diminished» or tiny being (esse diminutum, an intelligible being that
is not a mere being of reason, but something in between ideal and real being) a precedence of
nature with respect to the divine knowledge thereof, since — according to the Subtle Doctor —
such essences do not stem from God’s thought, but from God’s thinking Himself as such. Such
a claim gives rise to a problem, namely whether it is God’s thinking that man is a rational
animal what makes it true; or if conversely it is because such a fact obtains — because it is a
truth — that God, who is infallible, thinks so. Although Leibniz would try to avoid the problem
by denying that one of the two alternative terms might have any priority over the other, the
problem remains of whether, when God knows an essence, He knows a mere idea (something
whose being reduces to its being thought), or something endowed with an entity in-itself.
Be that as it may, Leibniz certainly identifies God’s notions with the pure notions of
things in themselves, i.e. with the essences-as-such of things. Those essences are uncreated (see
Théod. III 415; Disc. XXX): should God create the essences-as-such, His understanding would
be unconstrained by any logical or metaphysical principles, and His will would be blind, as the
casting of the dice, the flip of a coin, or a whirling roulette — the wheel of Fortune. God would
then act at whim, in a haphazard, random, fortuitous, way. His decisions would be adventitious,
causeless, undetermined.
The essence-as-such of every individual expresses only whatever will be true of that
individual if it exists. Leibniz’s famous example is that, once Julius Caesar is put into existence,
he could not help crossing the Rubicon. Once Adam was put into existence, he could not help
sinning. And it is senseless to hanker after more strength or more riches, or to wish one had
other parents: that would amount to wanting not to exist. (And, once any entity among those
which constitute this world is put into existence, so must be all the others, since every essence-
as-such of an individual expresses the whole universe, containing as it does the property of
belonging to a world wherein ... exists — where the ellipsis can be replaced by a designator of
any entity which has existed or will exist. In virtue of the principle of identity of indiscernibles,
no individual can inhabit two different possible worlds — let us say so even if, barring the real
world, possible worlds are mere fictions.)
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That is why Leibniz claims that praedicatum inest subiecto: the essence-as-such of an
individual is a law of formation of an infinite series of predicates; every true statement ascribes
to one of the predicates contained in that series its membership of the series. The entity once
given, all that it will do or undergo follows with necessity; the future necessarily follows from
the present, and the present from the past: le présent est gros d’avenir.
Leibniz had suggested that every essence is a complete intersection of previously given
predicates, i.e. of predicates which exist in God with some sort of precedence with respect to
their combination. But later on (see [B:1], p. 162) he changes his mind in that connection: such
a combination of predicates or ideas previously given is impossible since every idea is modified
when it enters a notion. In other words, ideas are not what they are independently of their being
able to be truthfully predicated of this or that individual. And, when they change, the individual
notions they enter into change, too. Depending on whether Nero was or not a singer, being a
singer will be a particular, determinate property, rather than a different one, the difference
spreading not only to Nero but to every singer, and to the entire world.
Since Leibniz realizes that, if Francis I is defeated in Pavia, it is not possible for him
not to be defeated in Pavia — i.e. there is no possible entity identical to Francis I not defeated
in Pavia —, he draws the conclusion that every possible individual exists in a possible world
only.
On the other hand, in order to preserve a certain independence or invariance of possible
individuals through different possible worlds, so as to make the sentence ‘Francis I could have
failed to be defeated in Pavia’ true in some sense, Leibniz claims that possibilia can be
considered in two ways: (1) sub ratione generalitatis (considering only some of the attributes,
not the complete notions); (2) sub ratione indiuiduorum (every substance involves the totality
of the system of compossibles of which it is part and parcel).
Such a solution encounters a difficulty: the predicates attributed in the first
consideration, viewed, accordingly, regardless of whether the subject in question possesses the
remaining properties it in fact possesses, are incomplete: each of them will be different
depending on whether the subject possesses or not every other property in the set. Ambition is
a different property altogether depending on whether, e.g., Catherine of Medici was ambitious
or not; caution is also a different property depending on whether she is cautious or not; but
Catherine, in her turn, is not the same regardless of whether she is ambitious or not; so, before
caution can be identified by the fact — among others — of that queen possessing that quality,
she has to be individuated by her possession of other attributes, at least of those which deserve
to be taken to constitute her-as-possible sub ratione generalitatis. But each of those attributes,
in turn, is bound to have been previously individuated or singled-out, which unavoidably
triggers an infinite regress. Thus nothing could apparently be individuated, since, before an
individual can be individuated, each «essential» property thereof must have been individuated;
before that, every individual endowed with that property has to have been individuated; and,
moreover, each of the other essential properties of the individual in question must also have
been previously individuated; and so on.
A solution to those difficulties would be the following: every individual is identified
by the properties it has, and each property is identified by the individuals endowed with it. But
in the same way as no individual can exist in two different worlds, no property can exist in
more than one world either. The individuation of individuals and of properties possessed by
them would be mutual or reciprocal, and properly speaking two worlds would share nothing at
all, neither their inhabitants nor the properties those inhabitants have or lack.
But then, how can an individual be considered merely possible sub ratione
generalitatis, i.e. as an entity endowed with a notion constituted by only a few among the
properties that do in fact constitute its [complete] notion? Those properties would lose their
«Essence and existence in Leibniz’s ontology» by Lorenzo Peña 8
identity should they be abstracted from the other properties the individual possesses. Thus taken,
the properties are no longer those which are in fact present in the real world: we are considering
them as if they were invariant through different possible worlds, or perhaps rather as if they
were elements of an indefinite pseudo-world which could be concretely realized both as the real
world and, alternatively, as a different «possible» world.
Thus a possible world cannot differ from the real only in a single contingent particular
fact. Once the smallest atom of the whole world-scheme is changed, everything changes. Two
different worlds are thus incommensurable. Talking about pure possibility is fantasy, nothing
else.
We can fall back on the following contrivance: suppose there is a world wherein
Pizarro does not conquer Peru. But Pizarro is identified by being Peru’s conqueror, among other
things. Then, let us suppose that Pizarro is identified, not as being the conqueror of Peru tout
court, but as being the conqueror-of-Peru-in-the-real-world. Such a view would lead us to
properties-as-functions, mapping possible-worlds and individuals into truth values. But then how
are possible worlds individuated? Moreover, ‘The real world’ would be a pleonastic expression,
if the «real world» is indeed the only world that is real, the others being purely and simply
unreal.
Another solution would be to lay down bare individuals, or bare properties,
independently identified. But that would be a glaringly anti-Leibnizian solution.
Even though the postulation of bare individuals, or haecceities, is anti-Leibnizian,
Leibniz suggests once (N.E. II XXVII 10) that God could, while extraordinarily changing the
real identity of an entity, keep its personal identity, provided a certain proprium quid of the
entity was retained, which would be constituted by both internal and external appearances. That
proprium quid would be over and above the predicates, and beyond them.
Be it as it may, such a solution, going as it does counter to the principle of identity
of indiscernibles, is profoundly anti-Leibnizian. What is more, in the rare passages wherein
Leibniz suggests the existence of such «overidentitties» of things he speaks about them in terms
of appearances, phenomena, and hence without any explanatory role.
§3.— HOW ARE ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE LINKED ACCORDING TO LEIBNIZ?
But now the thorniest and most serious problem must be brought up: does existence
belong to that series of predicates? Or is existence (or, if you want, would-be-existence, or
tendential-existence) extrinsic to the essence-as-such? Leibniz’s repeated claims favouring the
latter alternative — on the face of them — are mustered by those who want to view Leibniz as
a contingentist philosopher. But we cannot disregard the fact that Leibniz lays down a bridge,
a transition, between the order of the essences-as-such and that of existences, namely: the
principle of sufficient reason — a principle which in turn, as we have already seen, cannot be
contingent. In accordance with that principle, for something to exist a sufficient reason must
be given; and, in the last resort, as the existence of an individual entails that of a particularly
determined possible world it belongs to, the ultimate sufficient reason for the existence of an
individual is that its essence-as-such, or notion, contains the predicate of belonging to the best
possible world. Since such a world is the only one God can in fact create, when God does
create it the individual in question is also put into existence — at least the individual is ascribed
the property of existing the moment it is suitable for it to start its career — even if Leibniz
sometimes seems to suggest that every monad exists always. Existence stems unavoidably from
a certain purely quidditative property or perfection of the essence-as-such, viz.: that of
belonging to the best possible world. And non-existence of whatever, failing to reach existence,
seemed to be possible but turns out in the end to be impossible (reducing to a mere fiction)
inevitably follows from a quidditative property of its own essence-as-such, namely: that of
belonging to a maximal set of entities that not is the best. Either to exist is to belong to the best
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possible order of things or at least the former property (existence) follows from the latter (that
of belonging to the best possible order).
On its own, by itself, every possible entity — Leibniz says — has a tendency — or
conatus — to existence. (If my construal is correct and, in the last resort, all unactualized
possible-entities turn out to be mere fictions, according to Leibniz, then that tendency will be
fictitious, too; it would be an analogical as if; needless to say, that as if fictionalism also
encounters many difficulties: what do such fictions consist in? What is its fictitious conatus or
tendency to exist? Problems Leibniz prefers to shrug on.)
The notion of conatus is central to Leibnizianism. Leibniz seems to often regard the
conatus towards a motion or a state as the very same motion or state, only in a smaller degree
— perhaps an infinitesimal one. The conatus contains the further course of the thing to which
it can truthfully be ascribed. What is in this connection hard to understand is that, if the conatus
ad existendum the uncreated essences-as-such are endowed with consists in a smaller degree
of existence, such an existence cannot be the divine existence (which is the existence those
essences are bound to possess, being as they are God’s ideas, while Leibniz rejects any real
distinction between God and God’s ideas — or in general God’s attributes or properties). Hence
such a smaller degree of reality or existence would be a degree of created existence. Then,
while still uncreated, the essences-as-such would be possessed of a created existence. Such a
conclusion is contradictory. Leibniz would adamantly reject any contradiction. (At this stage
we know that systems or theories containing contradictions are perfectly possible and logically
admissible, thanks to the existence of paraconsistent logics. Such a perspective was not open
to Leibniz. Nor — unlike other philosophers, such as Nicholas Cusanus — did he ever have any
ever so faint inkling on the possibility of contradictorial but logically admissible theories.)
Yet a still more serious difficulty arises as regards the Leibnizian view of existence:
what is existence according to Leibniz? Does it reduce to the property of belonging to the best
order of things? Or is it something else, even if it supervenes on the aforementioned property?
If the former alternative is chosen, the essences-as-such do exist (with such an existence as
befits them qua finite essences or of finite beings). Then nothing except God and his ideas
would exist, which would be a pantheism much more radical than Spinoza’s. Spinoza admits
a real difference — at least an objectively modal one — between God and his modes, the latter
being entities truly different from God; whereas, as the reist he is, Leibniz does not accept the
existence of non-substantial entities, and so is bound to lay down a real identity between God
and his ideas, including the notions or essences-as-such of created entities. The irksome and
unpalatable outcome of such a line of reasoning would then be not just full-fledged absolute
pantheism, but even Parmenidean monism. The outcome can be avoided only if existence does
not reduce to the quality of belonging to the best possible order of things, even if it supervenes
on it. Even so, if that quality supervenes on the considered property of belonging to the best
possible order of things, it will also be possessed or exemplified by the essences-as-such.
More explicitly, Leibniz says in his already quoted booklet Generales Inquisitiones de
Analysi Notionum et Veritatum: ‘Aio igitur Existens esse Ens quod cum plurimis compatibile
est’. (‘I say, accordingly, that the existent is what is compatible with the most things.’) Does
that mean that existence is defined through that compatibility with most things, with the greatest
ontological riches? Or does it mean that all, and only, those possible-entities that are compatible
with the maximal ontic riches receive existence? A strongly extensionalist point of view
(according to the which two properties are identical if whatever possesses one of them also
possesses the other) should reduce the latter construal to the former, but, then, all contingency
would vanish, created existence becoming a constituent note of the divine eternal idea of the
created entity; which means that such an existence would not be created. That strongly
necessitarian interpretation of existence seems to be borne out by Leibniz’s claim (quoted by
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Knecht in [K:1], p.230): ‘Existere nihil aliud esse quam harmonicum esse...’
On the other hand, Leibniz often says that to every essence its own degree of existence
corresponds, and that no two different creatures may have the same degree of existence or
reality; otherwise, they would have the same degree of essential perfection, and so they would
be indiscernible; which, in virtue of the principle of identity of the indiscernible, would mean
that those «two» things would be one and the same thing. (Leibniz seems to assume that no two
different things can share the same degree of essential or quidditative perfection, nor
accordingly of existence; in other words: that the extent of existence merited by an essence-as-
such will be either larger or smaller than that corresponding to any other essence-as-such. Such
a claim is stronger than the principle of identity of indiscernibles. What Leibniz seems to take
for granted is that two identical degrees of existence are the same existence, and no two
different things can have the same existence.) Well and good, but what is that something which
is merited by the essence-as-such in proportion to its intrinsic quidditative perfection (provided
such an essence belongs to the best possible order of things)? What is existence? Upon
receiving it does the essence-as-such undergo some metamorphosis or transmutation? Does it
«come out» from God? Otherwise, how can it receive existence, when it already was possessed
of divine existence, which was its own being?
Finding no answer to such questions which he does not even dare to bring up openly,
Leibniz sometimes seems to want to approach existence by means of purely empirical finding.
Thus, in a autobiographic fragment of 1666 (reprinted by Foucher de Careil in Mémoire sur la
philosophie de Leibniz, t.I) Leibniz develops his early view of existence: existence is not a
predicate, he says in effect. He makes it plain that he drew the conclusion that we men can
assert only what we perceive, or, at most, that whose effects we perceive. But, as it cannot be
said that only what we perceive exists, Leibniz at that early stage drew the conclusion that for
something to exist is for it to be perceived by an infallible spirit of which we would be mere
emanations (euius nos tantum effluvia essemus). Solipsism is unthinkable even as a hypothesis,
Leibniz tirelessly repeats against Descartes.
Such views can be put against the background of Leibniz’s well-known and repeated
claim from his early booklet Disputatio Arithmetica de Complexionibus (or rather from the
Appendix to that booklet that is a part of his essay De Arte Combinatoria, both of which were
written in march of 1666): necessary truths, guaranteed by the law of non-contradiction, must
be distinguished from contingent or existential truths.
But such a view would bring us back to a position incompatible with the conclusions
Leibniz rightly derives from his own principles, which call for a bridge of sorts between the
reign of essences and that of existences, a supervenience of existence on the quality of
belonging to the best order of possible things; and even a one-to-one correspondence between
degrees of existence and degrees of intrinsic quidditative perfection of the essence-as-such.
In other essays, Leibniz defines existence as the possibility of being perceived (esse
nihil aliud esse quam percipi posse, [B:1] p. 107). But sensation by itself does not prove
anything: a dreamed palace is not a real palace. And there are real things which are not
perceived. Thus Leibniz draws the conclusion that to exist is not the same as to be perceived.
What makes the difference between our true and our false sensations is that the former alone
sunt consentientes.
Now, coherence among sensations must have some cause. Existence is that quality of
the perceived objects that makes us have coherent sensations. Then, far from defining existence
through an empirical-sensorial content, Leibniz’s later views regard existence as something
more fundamental, something presupposed by the reliability of sensations.
Let us examine this doctrine in the context of the Leibniz’s mature views, according
to which sensations are obscure perceptions, while ideas or concepts are clear perceptions. Will
«Essence and existence in Leibniz’s ontology» by Lorenzo Peña 11
we be bound to say that what exist is that which generates perceptions which are obscure but
coherent? Why? What privilege is deserved by such a capacity of producing obscure, rather than
clear, perceptions? On the other hand, if whatever is clearly conceivable and coherent exists,
we would be espousing a strictly Spinozian necessitarianism, despite Leibniz’s hopes to keep
clear of it.
Yet the former alternative cannot be seriously taken to be Leibniz’s considered
conception, since then existence would be devalued, becoming an inconceivable remainder,
something darkly perceivable only — so to speak, like irrational and unintelligible dregs. What
is more: existence must be the same property for God and for created things, yet God has no
obscure perception and He cannot perceive himself obscurely. And Leibniz has said that nihil
aliud est realitas quam cogitabilitas. What is only clearly thinkable cannot be bound to lack
existence. Yet the essences-as-such are clearly thinkable. What else is «added» in order for
them to reach existence?
We could look for a solution through what Leibniz says in his logic booklet «De
Organo siue Ars Magna Cogitandi», on the in basis of previous essays devoted to binary
arithmetics. Leibniz draws a diadic system that only uses digits 1 and 0: God and Nothingness;
it thus symbolizes the origin of creatures and their infinite progression, which owe to God —
the positive fact — their perfection and to Nothingness — the negative fact — their imperfection
and their limitations (see [B:1], p. 133, and also [K:1], p. 244). Thus, the finite existence of
creatures results from a certain combination of being (God) and not-being (Nothingness). But
such a combinatorial implementation does not seem compatible with the most central theses of
Leibniz’s approach. The monadologic system allows for no such entity as Nothingness; and
furthermore such a solution would entail the presence of two ultimate and mutually irreducible
principles of things, which is not acceptable within the framework of Leibniz’s theodicy. Most
of all, such a solution is contradictory, since for an entity to be Nothingness or not-being means
that it both is and is not; but Leibniz’s general views cannot be reconciled with any admission
of true contradictions.
In summary, for Leibniz, the essence grounds the existence, but the essence itself needs
an existential support; yet, Leibniz did not manage to establish that those two theses are
compatible with one another. Moreover, within the system of preestablished harmony, all truths
of fact quoad nos emerge as truths of reason quoad se; thus in the last resort the whole order
of being-there escapes from its apparent factuality, so much so that an infinite intellect sees
reality as a coherent set of necessary and transparent connections founded on reason. Within
that frame the divide between essentialism and existentialism is blurred, to the point of
disappearing, since the order of existences turns out to be the same as the order of essences
viewed from a certain angle. It is hard though to find a satisfactory account of the difference
between angles.
The internal strain Leibniz’s thought suffers from can be put as follows. Leibniz faces
this problem: how to conciliate two fundamental intuitions underlying all the system of
preestablished harmony, that according to which, existence being a perfection, the concept of
an existing entity must contain more than that of a non-existing entity (see [S:1], p. 127) and
that according to which existence is extrinsic to essence, and thus the essence of a real thing
would not differ from that of the same thing considered solely sub ratione possibilitatis (as
Leibniz suggests in its booklet De Veritatibus Primis).
In other words, it seems to be no final, satisfactory answer to the question of what
existence is and how, according to Leibniz, it is not included in the essence of the thing,
although it follows from it, and how nevertheless the existent thing in created reality is not the
same as the essence-as-such, but a different entity which «mirrors» the essence-as-such or
which «corresponds to it». What is then the difference between the idea-of-existence (created
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or finite), that is in the essence-as-such, and the created or finite existence itself?
Oddly some authors claim that according to Leibniz existence is the sole predicate God
bestows or withholds freely, i.e. haphazardly or just-because (because he pleases to do so, as
the only or the ultimate «explanation»!). (Such is J. Skosnik’s opinion, [S:2], p. 690.) That is
not so. The argument Skosnik backs up that interpretation with is that, occasionally (e.g. in a
letter to Arnauld) Leibniz says that every existent can be conceived as a mere possible. But
Leibniz proceeds to add that, thus conceived, the existent is a complete notion containing
predicates which correspond to all its actions and relations — Skosnik grants it; and, thus, it
contains the quality of belonging to the sole order God is going to create, the only one He can
create (should He create a different one, He would betray himself, and He would not be God,
since He would be creating a world less good that the best possible one). Then, as God cannot
but create this world, He cannot refrain from creating every integral component of the world,
since, one of them once removed, not this world but a different one would exist (in virtue of
the principle of identity of indiscernibles).
But Skosnik rightly points out a difficulty: if the existence of finite entities is necessary
for Leibniz — as it indeed is — , how can God consider such an entity «independently of its
existence»? (That sounds as considering gold «leaving aside» its being a metal: does that make
any sense? What such an «abstraction» or «leaving-aside» could consist in?) Moreover, Leibniz
tirelessly repeats that, in all true statement, the predicate inest subiecto, that the concept of the
predicate is included in that of the subject. Such a principle applies unrestrictedly, and so is
bound to apply to existential statements, too, despite Leibniz’s occasional misgivings. What
Leibniz cannot offer is a compelling, cogent, clear reason why the principle fails to apply to
existential statements. The principle means that any statement is true if, and only if, it can be
proved (we know that truths of fact quoad nos cannot be proved by us because the proof would
need infinitely many steps). Then an existential statement is true if, and only if, it can be
proved — i.e. if, and only if, it is a necessary truth.
An amazing feature of Skosnik’s construal is his claim — upon which his whole
interpretation hinges — to the effect that, for Leibniz, there is no link between an individual and
the world it inhabits. To the contrary! Although Leibniz asserts — as Skosnik emphasizes — that
every individual is a world apart, that means only that nothing enters monads and nothing
comes out of them, each monad being closed; yet every monad mirrors the whole universe, and
a monad is the particular entity it is, rather than another, depending on the universe it inhabits.
Thus, pace Skosnik, it is true for Leibniz that, had Erasmus failed to exist in this world, he
would not have written the Praise of folly. A different «entity», however similar to Erasmus,
but not Erasmus himself, might have written such a book (well, not that book, but another if
very similar one) in some other possible world; but, in the end, not even that is true for Leibniz,
since that other world would be possible only if God could create it; its possibility calls for God
to break the principle of creating (only) the best; and that in turn calls for God himself to be
less than optimal, which is impossible.
Skosnik proposes a «free logic» (it would be less inaccurate to call it ‘logic free from
actual-existence assumptions’, since it contains presuppositions of possible-existence) and
asserts — erroneously, to my mind — that such a logic reflects Leibniz’s conceptions. But it is
worthwhile to remark that, although he admits that sundry Leibnizian texts uphold the PPE
principle (namely, the principle that what is possible can exist), i.e. the principle according to
which, whenever an entity with certain characteristics is possible, it is possible for there to be
such an entity — i.e. it is possible that there exist an entity with those characteristics —, Skosnik
is bound to reject that principle. He even claims that PPE is not is a principle Leibniz should
want to espouse ([S:2], p. 715). However Leibniz clearly advocates PPE — as most people do.
Admittedly, when combined with other Leibnizian principles, PPE entails that, if a predicate
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can be attributed to something, that something exists. What Skosnik concludes is that
«therefore» Leibniz is bound to reject PPE, and to assert that some possibilia cannot exist, i.e.
that some possible «entities» are such that it is impossible for them to exist.
To sum up, construals such as Skosnik’s (one among the swarming legion of
fashionable contingentist interpretations Leibniz’s philosophy has undergone of late) seem to
be doomed. According to Leibniz existence, every existence, is necessary. That is why he
defines (see [C:1], p. 349) ‘ens’ as ‘possibile’. If to be an Ens, to be something which is, is the
same as to be possible, then whatever can be is. In the in end, all things considered, when
everything is taken account of, real, existing entities alone turn out to be possible at all. That
is why Leibniz acquiesces to the saying (ibid. n.) Non-Entis nulla sunt attributa.
REFERENCES
[B:1] Yvon Belaval, Leibniz: Initiation à sa philosophie. Paris: Vrin, 1962
[C:1] Louis Couturat, La logique de Leibniz d’après des documents inédits Hildesheim: G.
Olms V., 1969 (reprint of the Paris 1901 edition).
[K:1] Herbert Knecht, La logique de Leibniz. Lausanne: L’âge de l’homme, 1981.
[R:1] André Robinet, Leibniz et la racine de l’existence. Paris: Seghers, 1962.
[S:1] Kenneth R. Seeskin, «Is Existence a Perfection: A Case Study in the Philosophy of
Leibniz», Idealistic Studies 8 (1978), pp. 124 ff.
[S:2] Jeffrey Skosnik, «Leibniz and Russell on Existence and Quantification Theory», Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, vol. X/4 (dec. 1980), pp. 681-720.
